aristotle abuse

Dave Long dl@silcom.com
Fri, 30 Nov 2001 12:00:46 -0800


> A fancy and (one would assume, then-) PC way of saying "that which
> is not expressly forbidden is permitted."  I would argue that taken
> in context with the above and other Aristotilean philosophy, he is
> actually arguing (albeit obtusely) for a minimum of law.

Jeff, 

I assume you read as quickly as you type,
so it shouldn't be too much effort to
actually digest the context given in the
Ethics and the Politics [0].

> > And therefore justice is
> > often thought to be the greatest of virtues. It is complete virtue in
> > the fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue"
> 
> Fluff.

You may find practical "actual exercise"
to be of no value compared with theory
(why do I picture you in the center of
Raphael's "School of FoRK" in an orange
robe and pink hat, pointing to the sky?)
but Aristotle appreciated application: [1]

| If these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure,
| have been dealt with sufficiently in outline, are we to suppose that
| our programme has reached its end? Surely, as the saying goes, where
| there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize
| the various things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue,
| then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it,
| or try any other way there may be of becoming good.

Does argumentation make men good?
	- most obey passion, not ration, and
	passion yields to force, not argument.

But people can be habituated to good [2]
	- and laws provide that discipline

|		       But it is surely not enough that when they are
|     young they should get the right nurture and attention; since they
|     must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to
|     them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking
|     to cover the whole of life; for most people obey necessity rather
|     than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is
|     noble.

Laws are a matter of public interest,
but also (to tie in with other FoRK
threads) best composed by specialists
in the field:

| And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by
| his care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is
| through laws that we can become good. For to get any one
| whatever-any one who is put before us-into the right condition is
| not for the first chance comer; if any one can do it, it is the man
| who knows, just as in medicine and all other matters which give
| scope for care and prudence.
 
So:

> > He seems to go much farther in appointing government the moral guardian
> > than I would!

is a fair characterization, and these
attempts to coerce Aristotle's thought
into a framework you find elegant are
like Procrustes coercing his guests'
limbs into a bedframe he found elegant.

-Dave

[0] those selections came from the Ethics,
but they are closely related.  The Ethics
concerns the virtue of people, and the
Politics concerns the virtue of a state.
The end of the former is an introduction
to the latter, as he states that it is
necessary to compose the state so that
the people will be virtuous; likewise,
the end of the latter is an introduction
to the former, as he states that it is
necessary to educate the people so that
the state will be virtuous.

[1] although there seems to be little
evidence he had much lasting influence
on Alexander, he was pragmatic enough
to not give the Athenians the "chance
to sin twice against philosophy", and
hence might have been close enough to
Alexander's government to give them a
reason to have.

[2] like land, by application of capital,
can be made habitually productive.  For
instance, orchards.  (from the pruning
of which we also understand dependence
in heirarchical structures -- a metaphor
thousands of years old, at least)